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Abstract— Current EU legislation states that premiums for 
agri-environmental schemes must be calculated based on 
forgone profit and additional costs. This approach has been 
implemented for the last decades without much success in 
farmer uptake, a situation that might even worsen as the 20% 
additional payment as incentive for participation has been 
excluded in the new EU Rural Development Framework 2007-
2013. This paper tries to explain why supply side estimated 
premiums  might not suffice to assure farm profitability 
investigating the role that fixed costs have on adoption. A farm 
profit maximizing model is proposed where fixed and 
transaction costs are split from variations in marginal profit. 
This model is then developed to identify the potential barriers 
to adoption associated with the presence of fixed compliance 
costs.  A sample of farmers eligible for an agri-environmental 
scheme entailing a land-use change is used to test whether the 
theoretical models are valid for explaining adoption decisions. 
Two different econometric specifications are used to identify 
the role of fixed costs, one assuming that uptake and surface 
decisions are governed by the same variables and another 
distinguishing both decisions.  Estimation results show that 
there is an adoption barrier derived from the initial farm 
technical assets and know-how affecting the fixed compliance 
costs of introducing the new crop. Therefore not compensating 
for fixed costs can curtail agri-environmental policy success. In 
addition, there is an adoption barrier derived from transaction 
costs which are reduced in the presence of social networks. 
 





Agri-environmental schemes (AES) are the main policy 
instrument currently available in the European Union to 
foster improvements in the relationship between agriculture 
and the environment. Prior research has identified that 
premiums based on forgone profit might not be sufficient to 
assure farmer participation, as risk-related issues can require 
premiums to more than cover the mean loss in profit is 
associated with adoption [1]. This theoretical assumption is 
corroborated estimating the additional payment as the 
difference between contingent valuation estimates of 
willingness to accept with actual forgone profits.   
Additionally the sign-up decision is not solely affected by 
farm technical characteristics [2], and premiums show a 
limited effect in fostering adoption, specially for low 
requirement measures. This findings together with the low 
enrolment rates detected throughout the EU for AES
1, 
suggest that the 20% incentive was not sufficient to foster 
AES sign-up. This paper expands the understanding of how 
supply side estimated premiums affect AES participation, 
introducing the consideration of the potential effects of 
fixed costs associated with sign-up. 
Several studies have considered factors influencing 
farmers’ participation, which can be categorised in four 
main categories [4]. Programme (type of measure, 
compensation paid, application costs, etc.) and market 
(demand for food and environmental quality) characteristics 
constitute the so-called extrinsic factors while farm (size, 
crop portfolio, etc.) and individual farmer (age, education, 
etc.) characteristics are intrinsic factors. Fixed costs related 
to adoption would cover all costs that do not vary with the 
amount of area enrolled, and are mainly related with 
investments (both in assets and know-how) needed to 
implement AES. An additional source of fixed costs can be 
transaction costs (TC), which are increasing with asset 
specificity. Assets can be considered specific when they are 
sunk, i.e., not profitable in any another activity. Therefore, 
actions and warrants needed to secure the transaction entail 
transaction costs which are themselves sunk. There is 
empirical evidence that AES requiring higher specific assets 
involve higher transaction costs, and that some transaction 
costs do not depend on the enrolled area: they are fixed 
costs [5]. Logically, such fixed transaction costs should run 
in parallel to fixed costs of specific assets. For cases where 
schemes imply on a change in the crop pattern, one special 
case of FC is related to the effect of the specific technology 
used in the crop produced previously to the implementation 
of the AES. A higher investment or specialization of the 
farmer implies higher land profitability, inducing a higher 
loss when the crop is removed.  
This paper tests whether fixed costs do indeed exist for 
AES implementation when these are asset specific and 
                                                           
1 While Austria, Finland and Luxembourg have more than two thirds of the 
UAA involved in agri-environmental measures; in Belgium, Denmark, 
Greece, the Netherlands and Spain the coverage is just a mere 5% of their 
total Utilised Agricultural Area [3]. 
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therefore provides evidence on whether the current 
approach to set premiums levels is adequate to foster 
adoption of this type of schemes.  
 
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The presented model considers that farmers when faced 
with the option whether to sign-up or not for an AES 
behave as profit maximizers. Adoption is geared by the 
increase in land profitability derived from a change in 
practices and/or land allocation. The profit structure is 
defined as to consider the effects of fixed costs associated 
either with current or alternative land management and 
transaction costs associated with AES implementation. For 
a simplified two activity model, where activity c is 
considered current practice and activity a the alternative 
proposed under a determined AES, this profit function can 
be presented as Equation 1. Farmers’ face a surface 
restriction in which the total eligible area (ST) is allocated 
between the two competing options, current production (Sc) 
and AES implementation (S). 
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Profit is split into three components, that associated with 
current production (a), that derived from implementation of 
AES (b) and that related with AES premium (ρ) and 
transaction costs (TC) (c). For each land use option, fixed 
costs are separately considered. Production associated profit 
depends on input-output prices (pi), the area under 
cultivation (Si) and technical factors (Z
T). Fixed costs (FCi) 
are assumed to be totally explained by Z
T, while fixed TC 
associated with AES implementation depends on Social 
Capital variables (Z
SC). Individual crop profit functions are 
assumed to be increasing and quasi concave with respect to 
the area allocated to the corresponding crop.  
To gain understanding on the effect of FC on sign-up 
decision, two cases are considered. In the first case, land use 
a existed before AES implementation and in the second it 
did not. If land use a was already present in the farm, the 
land allocation equilibrium before AES implementation 
requires that fixed costs are covered for both crops and 
marginal returns are equal (Equation 2), where S* is the 
optimal area for use a. 
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The introduction of an AES displaces this equilibrium to 
S
*AES as marginal profit for land use a is increased as long 
as TC are covered  (Equation 3), while fixed costs 
associated with each crop remain unchanged in the new 
allocation of land. 
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If land use a was not present in the farm before AES 
implementation, fixed costs start playing a role. The 
restriction in equation 3 must be re-written to take this into 
account and is re-written as Equation 4. 
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Fixed Costs related to current land use are not 
considered, as they do not change with the reduction of 
cereal area, although they might play a role through their 
effect on land profitability related to this use, specially if 
they are not recoverable (i.e. sunk costs). 
 
III. CASE STUDY 
 
In order to test this hypothesis, a sample of eligible 
farmers for the Alternative Crop AES
2 have been surveyed. 
Alternative Crop AES requires allocating rain-fed land to 
alfalfa, thus fitting our theoretical model and allowing to 
consider farmers who already have this land use and those 
facing a land use change. Overall this measure can be 
considered as a high-asset specificity one due to the change 
in the crop pattern involved. This change demands know-
how and increases opportunity cost as alfalfa harvest is not 
assured due to weather variability. Fieldwork has been 
undertaken in Northern Spain with 156 dry-land farmers, 
40% of which had enrolled in this particular AES. The final 
version of the questionnaire gathered data regarding three 
main topics: a) farm basic data with special interest in cattle 
management, b) attitudes, opinion, knowledge and 
enrolment in AES and c) basic farmer socio-economic 
data
3. 
In order to evaluate the structural decision on AES 
adoption and to assess to what extent “fixed costs” is 
limiting adoption, two econometric models have been 
estimated. First, results from a double censored tobit model 
                                                           
2 A detailed description of the measure requirements can be found 
in BOA [6]. 
3 The questionnaire is available upon request to the authors.  
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AES * *
on the area enrolled  are compared with a probit model 
reflecting the decision to participate on the program. The 
double censored tobit model best suits a situation where FC 
are not relevant, that is Equation 1 minus the FC and TC 
components. If this model is solved without considering the 
surface restriction, the optimal surface allocation to use a 
(S
**AES) can be negative, compliant with the restriction or 
higher than the available eligible area. It would represent 
the dual value of the marginal profit of land if the farmer 
were obliged to contract. The actual enrolled area S has the 
following characteristics: it is a left censored variable, since 
it equals zero when the contract is not profitable; it equals 
S
**AES when the surface restriction in Equation 1 holds; and  
is also a right censored if S
**AES exceeds ST. The most 
suited econometric specification for this type of variable is a 
simple tobit with upper and lower censures and S
**AES as a 
latent variable. Under this modelling framework, 
determinants of fixed transaction costs, like the source of 
information about AES or the investment in skills, must not 
be significant. If this is so, the tobit results must be 
compatible with the probit estimation of the probability to 
enrol, because such a decision would also be governed by 
the same latent variable S
**AES. 
 
The upper and lower bounded tobit model specification is 
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To test whether FC do play a role, estimates obtained 
from Equation 5 are compared with those obtained using a 
two-stage Heckman model. Unlike the tobit model, this 
approach explicitly splits the contracting behaviour into two 
decisions related to each other: participating or not in the 
AES and surface enrolled.  This procedure allows 
identifying factors influencing adoption and area enrolled 
decisions separately. If results for the first step are different 
than those obtained in the tobit model, then some evidence 
regarding the role of FC can be obtained. Moreover, under 
the assumption that “fixed costs” are not related to the area 
enrolled in the AES, differences in estimates between sign-
up and enrolled decisions would further support the 
presence of FC. If determinants significantly influence the 
adoption without influencing the area under contract, or 
influence both in opposite ways, this means that they are 
determinants of fixed costs and that fixed costs exists. If 
both adoption and enrolled area of contractors are governed 
by the same determinants and in the same way, it means that 
there are no significant fixed costs. In this case the adoption 
and the enrolled area both depend on the comparison 
between the offered premium and the difference in marginal 
returns of alternative land uses.  
The first step of the Heckman method is a probit model 
analysing the probability of contracting based on the 
assumption of payment higher than the change in profit, 
taking into account both transaction and fixed costs as 
defined in Equation 1. The latent variable of the probit 
model, z, is defined in Equation 6, z is the difference in 
profit with and without contract, assuming farmers consider 
the optimal enrolled area if they would be obliged to 
contract.  The results of the first step are used to calculate 
the inverse mills ratio (λ). The second step models the 
contracted area (S
*AES ) using a OLS regression, including λ 
to take into account the outcomes of the first step. This 
parameter accounts for differences between participants and 
non-participants captured by the error term. The contracted 
area is the optimal area, given the contract is accepted. 
 
a
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This double decision framework is modelled as follows:  
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Where Z is the vector reflecting variables which are 
assumed to affect the enrolment decision and/or surface 
enrolled. The function Φ is the cumulative function of the 
reduced and centred normal distribution and ϕ the 
corresponding density function. The first step is modelled as 
a simple probit model where: 
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This model allows estimating β/σ under the assumption of 
normality for ui. For the second step the conditional 
expected value of the area enrolled, Si
*AES, is calculated 
imposing that Zi is strictly positive. Parameters α and δ=θ γ  
can be estimated without bias by OLS for si> 0. The optimal 
area under contract is derived from Equation 3 unrestricted, 
therefore depending on farm technical factors affecting the 
marginal profit of both crops, and not affected by fixed 
costs. 
 
          
(9) 
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In order to test the effect of fixed costs the following 
assumptions are put forward. Using the same explanatory 
variables to model the contracted area (S
*AES), if there were 
no fixed costs, the estimated coefficients in both steps will 
be similar, scaled by λ, that is the latent variable and 
enrolled area only depend on the comparison between the 
offered premium and the difference in marginal returns of 
alternative land uses. If not, the effect of  technical variables 
limiting adoption, due to asset specificity cereal 
specialization, new compliance costs associated with the 
introduction of alfalfa and/or TC, would be detected. 
For the objective of this research, fixed cost definition 
becomes a key issue. Fixed costs are related to fixed 
“compliance costs” associated with new land use specific 
investments and know-how, as well as to the pre-existing 
land use investments and fixed transaction cost related to 
information gathering before contracting, contract signing 




Tables 1 and 2 display the results from the double 
censored model estimation (Equation 5) and the results of  
the estimation of the two-step Heckman model (Equations  
8 and 9 respectively). The comparison of  the double 
censored tobit model and the first stage of the Heckman 
method supports the existence of fixed costs, as technical 
variables which are significant for the sign-up decision do 
not influence the enrolled area for the full sample 
(IRR_CER, OVINE) and vice versa (ELI_AREA). 
Additional support for this hypothesis is obtained 
comparing both steps in the Heckman model, as significant 
technical variables of the first step are no longer significant 
for the second and there is a sign reversal for the presence 
of livestock which positively affects sign-up and negatively 
enrolled area. 
Some information regarding the nature of the fixed costs 
associated with this AES can be obtained from a detailed 
analysis of individual variables. Social capital variables, 
which are significant for the adoption and are not for the 
enrolled area, would reflect that fixed costs are not only 
technical in nature but include transaction costs. Technical 
variables describing specialisation in cereal crops impede 
adoption, while the presence of alfalfa before the scheme or 
the presence of irrigated alfalfa favours adoption. This 
points at crop management know-how as a potential source 
of fixed costs although cereal specialization could be 
signalling higher marginal profits for this crop and the 
presence of corner solutions due to a lack of total surface 
(i.e. S
**AES > ST). 
 
Table 1 Double censored tobit model for area enrolled and % of eligible area enrolled as dependent variables 
 
  Area enrolled  Share area enrolled/eligible 
area 
Variable  Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value   
Constant -0.721  0.9321  0.293  0.0516 
Eligible area (number of ha) (ELI_AREA)  0.162  0.0000  -1.820  0.9793 
Non-irrigated cereal specialization farmer (1 if yes) ( SPE_NIRR_CER)  -27.151  0.0015  -0.479  0.0022 
Crop distribution includes irrigated cereal (1 if yes) (IRR_CER)  -8.237  0.2621  -0.308  0.0187 
Farm owns harvester (1 if yes) (HARV)  -52.491  0.0018  -0.491  0.0641 
Farm already had pulse crops before AES (1 if yes) (NIRRI_ALF)  14.447  0.0274  0.243  0.0415 
Crop distribution includes irrigated alfalfa (1 if yes) (IRRI_ALF)  15.343  0.0262  0.326  0.0085 
Z
T
Presence of livestock in the farm-hold (1 if yes)  (OVINE)  -3.706  0.5822  0.035  0.7735 
Farmer is a member of a cooperative (1 if yes)  (COOP)  -11.308  0.1202  -0.310  0.0168 
Farmer attends agricultural formation courses (1 if yes) (FORM)  5.377  0.4120  0.079  0.5063 
Farmer obtains information from financial entities (1 if yes) (FIN_ENT)  24.709 0.0188  0.230  0.2279 
Z
sc
Farmer uses more than one source for advice (1 if yes) (ADD_INF)  8.826  0.2686  0.178  0.2152 
26.583  0.0000 0.487  0.0000  γ 
N = 104 
-2log likelihood  = 542.578  
N = 104 
-2log likelihood  = 142.764  Model Fit Statistics 
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Table 2 Two-Step adoption model for  the Alternative Crop AES 
 
Sign-up decision (z)  Area enrolled (s) 
Variable  Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value   
Constant -0.322  0.4231  41.954  0.0485 
Eligible area (number of ha) (ELI_AREA)  0.002  0.3305  0.144  0.0004 
Non-irrigated cereal specialization farmer (1 if yes) ( SPE_NIRR_CER)  -0.894  0.0494  -5.510  0.5760 
Crop distribution includes irrigated cereal (1 if yes) (IRR_CER)  -0.957  0.0086  13.034  0.1958 
Farm owns harvester (1 if yes) (HARV)  -2.048  0.0149  -17.236  0.4352 
Farm already had pulse crops before AES (1 if yes) (NIRRI_ALF)  1.091  0.0016  -9.108  0.3804 
Crop distribution includes irrigated alfalfa (1 if yes) (IRRI_ALF)  0.597  0.0982  8.580  0.2607 
Z
T
Presence of livestock in the farm-hold (1 if yes)  (OVINE)  0.765  0.0269  -24.212  0.0128 
Farmer is a member of a cooperative (1 if yes)  (COOP)  -0.702  0.0647  0.052  0.9948 
Farmer attends agricultural formation courses (1 if yes) (FORM)  0.869  0.0176  -10.724  0.2228 
Farmer obtains information from financial entities (1 if yes) (FIN_ENT) 1.822 0.0136 0.222 0.9876 
Z
SC
Farmer uses more than one source for advice (1 if yes) (ADD_INF)  0.662  0.1425  5.740  0.5048 
λ     -26.607  0.2198 
N = 104 
-2log likelihood model = 
88.515 
χ
2= 51.79 p-value= 0.0000 
Mc Fadden R2 = 0.3691  
% of correct predictions = 
78.8 
N = 62 
R
2 =
  49.6% 
χ
2= 57.01 p-value= 0.0000 




Compensating for transaction costs might not suffice to 
assure enrolment, as fixed compliance costs can be 
independent of TC and curtail sign-up trough a (negative) 
effect on marginal profitability. Moreover, other 
strategies to increase adoption, such as the promotion of 
social networks to assure more efficient information 
dissemination and generating a reduction in transaction 
costs, albeit necessary
5, would not solve this problem if 
FC are relevant.  
V. SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The results presented support that the adoption 
decision for the AES considered is influenced by the 
existence of fixed costs. Fixed costs are explained both by 
technical and social capital variables, and thus, are made 
up of both compliance and transaction costs. Technical 
FC for land use change are related to pre-existing assets 
in the farm. Specialized cereal growers with higher 
marginal profitability of land due to capital investments 
(harvester
4 or irrigation) are less willing to apply for the 
AES, as changes in the crop pattern involve not only 
lower marginal profits but also,loss of partly sunk costs.  
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Reported results are in line with those which identify 
the constraints involved by specific investments regarding 
the AES compliance costs [5]. In our case, more 
technically demanding measures such as those which 
imply a change in the crop pattern seem to highlight the 
role of fixed compliance costs making them less 
profitable and thus, less probable of being adopted, than 
measures where only marginal costs are at stake. If new 
AES promoted under the EU rural development 
programme for 2007-2013 want to follow a “deep and 
narrow” approach (i.e very specific measures with 
demanding crop and management changes) current 
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